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Abstract
Human capital theory is the dominant approach for understanding personal
income distribution. According to this theory, individual income is the result of
‘human capital’. The idea is that human capital makes people more productive,
which leads to higher income. But is this really the case? This paper takes
a critical look at human capital theory and its explanation of personal income
distribution. I find that human capital theory’s claims are dubious at best. In
most cases, the theory is either not supported by evidence, is so vague that it is
untestable, or is based on circular reasoning. In short, human capital theory is
a barrier to the scientific study of income distribution.
Keywords: human capital theory; income distribution; critique; hierarchy; productiv-
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1 Introduction
Human capital theory is the dominant approach for understanding personal in-
come distribution. According to this theory, individual income is the result of
‘human capital’. The idea is that human capital makes people more productive,
which leads to higher income. But is this really the case? This paper takes a
critical look at human capital theory and its explanation of personal income dis-
tribution. I find that human capital theory’s claims are dubious at best. In most
cases, human capital theory is either not supported by evidence, is so vague that
it is untestable, or is based on circular reasoning. In short, human capital theory
is a barrier to the scientific understanding of income distribution.
Human Capital Theory’s Causal Chain
human capital=) productivity=) income
My discussion is organized around human capital theory’s causal chain, shown
above. What I hope to show is that this causal chain is deeply flawed and is con-
tradicted by the available evidence.
After a brief review of the origins of human capital theory (Section 2), I inves-
tigate the link between productivity and income (Section 3). Scores of empirical
investigations have purported to find evidence for such a link. The problem is
that they are all based on circular logic. They find a link between productivity
and income because they measure productivity in terms of income. But when
productivity is measured objectively using physical units, the link between in-
come and productivity becomes tenuous. I find that productivity differences
between workers are too small to explain observed levels of income inequality.
A further problem is that productivity may not even be an ‘individual trait’, as
human capital theory claims. Evidence from animal studies suggest that social
setting can affect individual productivity. In other words, productivity can be a
‘social trait’.
After finding little evidence for the productivity-income hypothesis, I look for
a relation between human capital and income (Secton 4). I find that this leads
to a Catch-22 situation. If we use an expansive definition of human capital, ob-
jective measurement becomes virtually impossible. But if we use a restrictive
definition (that is measurable), we can account for only a small fraction of in-
come variation. Proponents of human capital theory often use a bait switch
technique. They begin with an expansive definition of human capital that is un-
measurable. But when it comes time to justify the theory, they point to the (very
modest) empirical success of a narrow definition of human capital. The form of
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human capital that is most often trumpeted is education. The problem is that
education’s effect on income appears to be dwarfed by the effect of hierarchical
rank.
In Section 5, I consider the possibility that hierarchical rank is just a potent
form of human capital. But this hypothesis has a key deficiency. Hierarchical
income gains are far larger than the observed differences in human productivity.
But if not productivity, then what explains income returns to hierarchical rank?
It is here that human capital theory becomes a barrier to scientific progress.
When we assume that income is caused by characteristics of the individual, we
fail to consider the obvious alternative. What if individual income has a social
cause? In a hierarchy, the most obvious social cause is the chain of command,
which is effectively a tool for concentrating power. What if power explains the
returns to hierarchical rank? I find evidence to support this hypothesis. Relative
income within firms scales strongly with the number of subordinates (which I
take to be a measure of hierarchical power).
I conclude in Section 6 with thoughts about future directions for income
distribution theory. If we abandon human capital theory, what should we replace
it with? I think we should focus on the power relations within social hierarchy.
Hopefully this will allow us to move forward from the half-century dead-end
that has been human capital theory.
2 Human Capital Theory’s Origins
Human capital theory originated in themid-20th century work of Mincer (1958),
Schultz (1961), and Becker (1962). These authors proposed a remarkably sim-
ple explanation of personal income. The idea is that individuals can gain skills
(human capital) that will make them more productive. This enhanced produc-
tivity then leads to greater income. As I discuss below, this was not a new idea.
The main accomplishment of human capital theory was to make this vision con-
sistent with the rest of neoclassical theory.
In many ways, human capital theory was an inevitable byproduct of a cen-
tury of political economic thought. The key ingredient was the deep-rooted
productivity-income hypothesis. The idea that income stems from productivity
has been a central tenet of political economy for more than a century. It was
formalized in neoclassical theory by Wicksteed (1894) and Clark (1899). Both
authors theorized that income distribution obeyed a ‘natural law’. In a market
economy, each factor of production would earn its marginal product. This was
the incremental increase in output caused by the incremental increase in input
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of capital/labor. Thus, if a capitalist earned more than a worker, it was because
an additional unit of ‘capital’ added more to output than an additional unit of
labor.
Marginal productivity theory was developed to explain functional income
distribution — the income split between workers and capitalists. But it logi-
cally implies a theory of personal income distribution. Let’s suppose that the
the productivity-income relation is universal. It follows that income differences
between workers (who all earn labor income) must be due to differences in indi-
vidual productivity. In hindsight, the development of human capital theory was
only a matter of time. According to neoclassical theory, capitalist income stems
from the productivity of capital. Maybe something similar is true for workers?
This was the hypothesis proposed by Mincer, Schultz, and Becker. Suddenly we
could think of ‘skills’ as ‘human capital’, just like we could think of machinery as
‘capital’. Wage differences between workers could then be attributed to differ-
ences in ‘human capital’.
Incidentally, neoclassical thinkers were not the only ones to arrive at this
conclusion. Some Marxists had very similar ideas. On the face of it, Marxist the-
ory is diametrically opposed to neoclassical theory. Marx (1867) thought that
capitalists earned their income by exploiting workers. This was very different
from the neoclassical vision of class harmony. But what about income differ-
ences between workers? Here, Marxist theory and human capital theory are not
that far apart. According to Marx, labor produces all value. But this implies
that high-paid skilled workers must be more productive than low-paid unskilled
workers. What accounts for these productivity differences? According to the
Soviet economist Isaak Illich Rubin (1973), it is the additional training of skilled
workers that makes them more productive. This thinking is virtually identical
to human capital theory.
Thus, the productivist tendencies of political economy naturally led to some
form of human capital theory. But there is a major sticking point to this ap-
proach. If income is caused by productivity, then human productivity must be
as unequally distributed as income (or nearly so). But this possibility was chal-
lenged by the work of Francis Galton and Vilfredo Pareto. Galton (1869) dis-
covered that human characteristics were normally distributed. No matter what
was measured (height, weight, IQ, etc.), human characteristics tended to clump
around an average value. It follows that human productivity should also be
normally distributed. The problem is that income bucks this trend. Vilfredo
Pareto (1897) showed that income distributions were highly skewed. Income
was far more unequally distributed than were human characteristics. Political
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economists have been grappling with this paradox for a century (Sahota, 1978).
The most common resolution to the Galton-Pareto paradox is to assume that
abilities have a multiplicative effect on productivity (Boissevain, 1939; Mandel-
brot, 1960). Human abilities remain normally distributed, thus satisfying Gal-
ton’s findings. At the same time, the multiplicative effect means that produc-
tivity can be highly skewed. This satisfies Pareto’s findings. This thinking is
often expressed as a production function. Worker’s output (Y ) is written as an
exponential function of the sum of different abilities (ai):
Y = ea1+a2+...+ai (1)
This thinking begs a question. Are abilities innate? Or are they learned?
Human capital theory asserts that most abilities are learned. But this has been a
major source of controversy. According to ‘screening’ theory, education does not
increase ability. Instead, education simply sorts individuals by their pre-existing
abilities (Spence, 1978; Hungerford and Solon, 1987).
While historically important, I find this ‘screening’ debate largely irrelevant.
The important question is not whether abilities are innate or acquired. Instead,
the important question is — can productivity differences explain income differ-
ences? If not, then both screening theory and human capital theory have a seri-
ous problem.
3 Productivity and Income
Any theory worth its salt must make falsifiable predictions. Human capital the-
ory’s prediction is unambiguous: workers’ income stems from productivity. Un-
fortunately testing this prediction leads to a measurement quagmire from which
few economists escape.
3.1 A Measurement Quagmire
To measure a worker’s marginal productivity, we must isolate the change in a
firm’s output that is due to the change in labor input alone. In most situations,
this is virtually impossible (Pullen, 2009). For instance, we must be able to
objectively measure the quantity of capital, in order to hold it constant. But as
the ‘Cambridge capital controversy’ showed, we cannot measure the quantity
of capital independently from the distribution of income (Cohen and Harcourt,
2003; Hodgson, 2005; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009; Robinson, 1953; Sraffa, 1960).
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Since it is the distribution of income that we wish to explain, this is a bit of a
problem.
We must also be able to objectively measure output. But how do we com-
pare workers who have qualitatively different outputs? For instance, how can we
determine if a potato farmer is more productive than a composer? Neoclassi-
cal theory solves the problem by slight of hand. It assumes a one-commodity
economy, in which output comparison problems do not exist (Colacchio, 2018).
But applied economists cannot be content with this approach. Real-world
tests of marginal productivity theory require comparing workers with different
outputs. This means choosing a common unit of analysis. But the choice of
unit is subjective, and different units will lead to different results. Economists
make things worse by chosing monetary value as a unit of comparison. Thus,
labor productivity is generally measured using sales or value-added per worker
(Abowd et al., 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Haskel et al., 2005; Hellerstein
et al., 1996; Hoegeland, 1999; Iranzo et al., 2008; Oulton, 1998). The prob-
lem with this approach is that it relies on circular logic. According to theory,
income is explained by productivity. But when the theory is tested, productivity
is measured using income.
Based purely on accounting principles, we expect wages to be correlated with
sales/value-added per worker. Double entry accounting principles dictate that
firm value added (Y ) is equivalent to the sum of all wages (W ) and capitalist
income (K). If we divide by the number of workers (L), we find that value-added
per worker is equivalent to the average wage (w=W/L) plus K/L:
Y
L
=
W + K
L
= w+
K
L
(2)
Sales (S) are similar, but include an additional non-labor cost term (C):
S
L
=
W + K + C
L
= w+
K + C
L
(3)
Thus, if we look for a correlation between averagewage (w) and value-added/sales
per worker (Y /L or S/L), we will surely find it. Simple accounting definitions
dictate that average wage is a major component of value-added per worker.
3.2 Measuring Productivity Differences Objectively
Under what conditions can we objectively compare differences in workers’ out-
put? The conditions are extremely restrictive. We can only compare workers
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Figure 1: Labor Productivity Inequality vs. Income Inequality
Using a Gini index, this figure compares the inequality of worker productivity to in-
come inequality within nation-states. Data for worker productivity dispersion comes
from Hunter et al. (1990), who report the coefficient of variation of productivity among
workers conducting the same task. Data plotted here shows the distribution of pro-
ductivity inequality for 52 different tasks. I convert Hunter’s data to a Gini index by
assuming that worker productivity is lognormally distributed. The Gini index (G) of a
lognormal distribution with a coefficient of variation cv is G = erf(
1
2
∆
log(c2v + 1)). I plot
the resulting distribution against the distribution of Gini indexes of income inequality
for all country-year observations in the World Bank database (series SI.POV.GINI).
Productivity and Income 8
who produce the same output. Most economists have not been interested in
such measurements. However, the psychologist John E. Hunter made it part of
his life’s work. Hunter et al. (1990) report output variability among workers
doing the same task. Importantly, many different types of tasks are measured.
The question is, how great is this output variability? Can it conceivably ac-
count for observed levels of income inequality? I test this possibility in Figure 1.
For each of the 52 different tasks measured by Hunter et al., I calculate a Gini
index of productivity inequality. I then plot the spread of this labor productivity
inequality. The results cluster around a Gini index of 0.1. Interestingly, this is
consistent with the known dispersion of human abilities. For instance, we can
take the SAT test as one measure of human ability. In 2017, the average score
on the US SAT was 1060, and the standard deviation was 195 (CollegeBoard,
2017). Assuming a normal distribution, this corresponds to a distribution of
ability with a Gini index of 0.1.
How does this productivity dispersion compare to levels of income inequal-
ity? To make this comparison, Figure 1 plots the distribution of income inequal-
ity within all nation-states in the World Bank database. The results do not bode
well for human capital theory. Productivity inequality is far too small to account
for observed levels of income inequality.
3.3 Is Productivity an ‘Individual Trait’?
Let’s be generous to human capital theory and put aside this under-explanation
problem. Let’s suppose that productivity inequality is similar to income inequal-
ity. Even then, there is a problem with the productivity-income hypothesis. Hu-
man capital theory assumes that productivity is an individual trait. But this could
be wrong. Individual productivity could be a social trait.
Experiments by the poultry geneticist William Muir highlight this possibility.
Muir conducted selective-breeding experiments that attempted to raise chickens’
egg-laying productivity. In one experiment, Muir selected the most productive
hen from each group to breed the next generation of hens. What happened?
Evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson summarizes:
Egg productivity plummeted, even though the best egg-layers had been se-
lected each and every generation. The reason for this perverse outcome is
easy to understand, at least in retrospect. The most productive hen in each
cage was the biggest bully, who achieved her productivity by suppressing the
productivity of the other hens. (Muir and Wilson, 2016)[emphasis added]
Human Capital and Income 9
The lesson, according to Wilson is that traits that can be ‘measured at the
individual level’ may not actually be ‘individual traits’:
Muir’s experiments ... challenge what it means for a trait to be regarded as an
individual trait. If by “individual trait” we mean a trait that can be measured
in an individual, then egg productivity in hens qualifies. You just count the
number of eggs that emerge from the hind end of a hen. If by “individual
trait” we mean the process that resulted in the trait, then egg productivity in
hens does not qualify. Instead, it is a social trait that depends not only on the
properties of the individual hen but also on the properties of the hen’s social
environment. (Muir and Wilson, 2016)
Human capital theory makes a seemingly self-evident assumption: the pro-
ductivity of individuals is an ‘individual trait’. But as Wilson notes, this is faulty
logic. When we study productivity differences among humans, we must con-
sider the social context. Just as with hens, highly productive humans may ac-
tually be suppressing the productivity of others. This behavior would invalidate
the premise of human capital theory (and much of neoclassical economics).
4 Human Capital and Income
Human capital theory posits a joint relation between human capital, produc-
tivity, and income. Unfortunately, the productivity-income component seems
tenuous at best. But perhaps there is still a link between income and human
capital? Let’s investigate.
The human-capital-income link has been a Catch-22 for empirical researchers.
On the one hand, restrictive definitions of human capital correlate poorly with
income. On the other hand, expansive definitions of human capital are often so
vague that they are unmeasurable. The first problem was recognized by Jacob
Mincer, a pioneer of human capital theory. In his initial work, Mincer defined
human capital restrictively as the number of years of formal education (Mincer,
1958). But he later found that this accounted for a very small portion of income
variability:
Simple correlations between earnings and years of schooling are quite weak.
Moreover, in multiple regressions when variables correlated with schooling are
added, the regression coefficient of schooling is very small. (Mincer, 1974)
In the face of this failure, many researchers broadened their definition of
human capital in an ad hocmanner. For just one example, take GregoryMankiw’s
definition in his bestselling microeconomics textbook. He defines human capital
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expansively as “the accumulation of investments in people” (Mankiw, 2012). It
is hard to see how this could possibly be measured objectively.
What has become common is a bait-and-switch technique. Economists begin
with an expansive definition of human capital that is unmeasurable. But when
it comes to justifying the theory, they point to the modest empirical success of
a more restrictive definition of human capital. Mankiw is a case in point. After
offering his expansive definition above, Mankiw switches to a more restrictive
definition to offer empirical evidence. He writes:
The most important type of human capital is education. ... Not surprisingly,
workers with more human capital on average earn more than those with less
human capital. (Mankiw, 2012)
Of course, Mankiw fails to mention that the correlation between education
and earnings is low. Still, income gains due to education are invariably used to
justify human capital theory. Why?
4.1 Education: The Only Game in Town?
It is true that education has a weak effect on income. But it is also true that al-
most everything we can measure about individuals has a weak effect on income
(when measured by raw correlation). What is important is the relative size of
an effect. In relative terms, the income-effect of education and training is quite
strong. This is a fact that heterodox economists often begrudgingly concede to
human capital theory (even if they do not accept human capital theory’s expla-
nation for the returns to education). In this sense, education is treated as the
only game in town.
But is this actually the case? Does education (and other forms of training)
affect income more strongly than any other factor? Cracks in this argument
were first exposed by Eric Wright (1979). Wright found that hierarchical rank
within firms affected income more than education. But how general is this re-
sult? Because the empirical work on firm hierarchy is quite sparse, it is difficult
to say. However, the available case-study evidence does not bode well for human
capital theory.
The most thorough case study of firm hierarchy (to date) was conducted
by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1993). I will refer to this as the BGH study.
BGH analyze the hierarchical structure of a large American firm for a period of
two decades, beginning in the late 1960s. And unlike other case studies of firm
hierarchy, BGH have made their raw data publicly available. I analyze the BGH
dataset to see if Wright’s results hold up.
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Figure 2: Returns to Education, Age, and Experience in the BGH Firm
This figure analyzes returns to education, age, and firm experience in the BGH firm from
1969 to 1985. The vertical axis of each panel shows normalized pay (income relative to
firm average pay in the year in question). Each data point represents an individual in a
given year. Panel A shows income returns to years of formal education. Panel B shows
income returns with age. Panel C shows income returns with years of firm experience.
Panel D shows the relation between income and individuals’ aggregate human capital
stock (see Eq. 4). All R2 values are from regressions on the logarithm of income. Grey
regions indicate the 95% prediction interval for each regression. To better visualize
discrete data, ‘jitter’ has been added to the horizontal axis of Panels A-C.
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Let’s look first at the relation between individual income and years of formal
education in the BGH firm. Figure 2A plots normalized income (income relative
to the firm mean in a given year) against years of formal education. As expected
there is a positive correlation, but it is weak. Next let’s look at age. If we are
generous to human capital theory, we can imagine that age as measure of the
human capital accumulated through life experience. As shown in Figure 2B,
incomes increase with age, but the relation is very weak. What about firm expe-
rience? We can treat firm experience as a measure of on-the-job training and/or
acquired skill. Not surprisingly, experience at the BGH firm has a significant
effect on income (Fig. 2C).
Let’s be generous to human capital theory and further suppose that educa-
tion, age, and firm experience all contribute to an individual’s aggregate stock of
human capital, K:
K= c1(education) + c2(age) + c2(firm experience) (4)
How strongly does this aggregate human capital stock affect income? To
answer this question, we need to provide values for the parameters c1, c2, and
c3. These parameters weight the various forms of human capital. To my knowl-
edge, human capital theory provides no way of determining these parameters.
Instead, econometricians typically estimate them using multivariate regression.
This chooses parameters such that K has the maximum effect on income.
Let’s give human capital theory the benefit of the doubt and do this. I es-
timate Eq. 4 parameters using a multivariate regression on the logarithm of
income. I then see how strongly K predicts income. The results are shown in
Figure 2D. As expected, the aggregate human capital stock (K) affects income
more strongly than education, age, or firm experience in isolation. Aggregate
human capital accounts for roughly one third of the variation of log income in
the BGH firm.
4.2 Returns to Hierarchical Rank
In the BGH firm, the income-effect of aggregate human capital is sizable. But the
problem is that it pales in comparison to the effect of hierarchical rank. As shown
in Figure 3, hierarchical rank accounts for almost two thirds of the variation
of log income in the BGH firm. This is roughly double the income variation
accounted for by our aggregate human capital stock.
But perhaps we are not being fair to human capital theory. It is possible that a
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Figure 3: Returns to Hierarchical Rank in the BGH Firm
This figure analyzes returns to hierarchical rank in the BGH firm from 1969 to 1985.
The vertical axis of each panel shows normalized pay (income relative to firm average
pay in the year in question). Each data point represents an individual in a given year.
The R2 value is from a regression on the logarithm of income. The grey region indicates
the 95% prediction interval of the regression. In order to better visualize discrete data,
horizontal ‘jitter’ has been added to the horizontal axis.
Table 1: A Multivariate Analysis of BGH Data
Partial Correlation with Log Income
Hierarchical Rank 0.705
Education 0.189
Age 0.103
Firm Experience -0.039
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large part of the returns to hierarchical rank are due to the returns to education,
age, and firm experience. Conversely, it is possible that none of the returns to
education, age, and firm experience are due to returns to hierarchical rank. We
can untangle this relation using a multivariate analysis. I regress log income
onto hierarchical rank, education, age, and firm experience. Table 1 shows the
results. The table values represent the partial correlation between the given
factor and log income. These values indicate the correlation when the effects of
the other factors have been removed.
Again, the results do not sit well with human capital theory. The isolated ef-
fect of hierarchical rank is far larger than any human capital factor. Interestingly,
the effect of firm experience disappears when we account for changes in hierar-
chical rank. This suggests that returns to firm experience are caused mostly by
climbing the corporate ladder. In other words, individuals who fail to advance
in rank do not have returns to firm experience.
5 Explaining Income Returns to Hierarchical Rank
The BGH evidence suggests that hierarchical rank affects income far more than
education (and other forms of training/experience). But perhaps this is not a
blow to human capital theory. Maybe hierarchical rank indicates some unmea-
sured form of human capital? Let’s consider this possibility.
The most general problem with this interpretation is that it has the hallmark
of pseudo-science. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) call this the “unobserved het-
erogeneity issue”. It is always possible to presume that “all pay differences are
related to skills (even if these skills are unobserved to the economists in the
standard data sets)” (ibid). While hinting that this is a problem, Acemoglu and
Autor go on to state that it is “not a bad place to start when we want to impose
a conceptual structure on empirical wage distributions” (ibid). I disagree. Karl
Popper (1959) long ago cautioned against theories that can explain any con-
ceivable evidence. To use Wolfgang Pauli’s phrase, such theories are “not even
wrong” (Burkeman, 2005).
But let’s put aside this problem. If hierarchical rank is a form of human
capital, what does this imply? Human capital theory is very clear that income
is proportional to productivity. Thus, returns to hierarchical rank must indicate
productivity difference between ranks.
But here we run into a problem. Income increases exponentially with hier-
archical rank. Are these exponential returns really due to productivity gains?
Unfortunately, we cannot test this directly, since we do not have direct (physi-
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Figure 4: Labor Productivity Inequality vs. Income Inequality Between BGH
Hierarchical Ranks
Using a Gini index, this figure compares the inequality of task-specific worker productiv-
ity to income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks. Data for worker productivity
dispersion comes from Hunter et al. (1990). (For methods see Fig. 1). Data plotted
here shows the distribution of productivity inequality for 55 different tasks. I compare
this to the income inequality between BGH hierarchical ranks. This equals the Gini in-
dex of hierarchical rank mean incomes. The blue density curve shows the distribution
of annual observations.
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cal) measures of productivity for the BGH workers. What we can do is return to
the task-specific productivity inequality shown in Figure 1. To reiterate, this is
the productivity dispersion among workers doing the same task. I have argued
that this is the only way to objectively measure individual productivity differ-
ences. Can this dispersion explain income inequality between BGH hierarchical
ranks?
Figure 4 tests this possibility. Here I re-plot the productivity dispersion data
from Figure 1. I then compare this to the income inequality between BGH hier-
archical ranks. To get the latter, I calculate the mean income in each hierarchical
rank of the firm (in a given year). I then calculate the Gini index of these mean
incomes. This is equivalent to selecting a representative individual from each
BGH hierarchical rank, and thenmeasuring the income inequality between these
individuals.
The results are unambiguous. Income inequality between BGH hierarchi-
cal ranks is far greater than our measure of productivity dispersion. Thus, it
seems improbable that income returns to hierarchical rank are due to produc-
tivity gains.
5.1 Power, not Productivity
If not productivity, then what explains the exponential returns to hierarchical
rank? Here, human capital theory becomes a barrier to scientific progress. Why?
The problem is that human capital theory puts the focus squarely on isolated
individuals. As long as we maintain this focus, we are blind to the obvious
alternative hypothesis. What if income does not result from individual traits?
What if income has a social cause?
Once we pose this alternative hypothesis, interesting ideas become possible.
For instance, returns to hierarchical rank could be a function of power. This puts
the focus on relations between people (not individual traits). One has power in
relation to (and because of) others. Think of a military commander. His power is
not an individual trait. Rather, it stems from other people’s willingness to obey
his commands.
The general study of power is complex, since power can have many forms.
But in a hierarchy, power is easier to pin down. A hierarchy is a nested set
of power relations between superiors and subordinates. Each superior wields
power over his direct subordinates, but also his indirect subordinates. This fea-
ture has important consequences. As illustrated by Figure 5, the total number
of subordinates tends to grow exponentially with hierarchical rank.
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Rank = 2
Subordinates = 2
Rank = 3
Subordinates = 6
Rank = 4
Subordinates = 14
Rank = 5
Subordinates = 30
Figure 5: The Exponential Growth of Hierarchical Power with Rank
In an idealized hierarchy, the total number of subordinates (blue) tends to grow expo-
nentially with hierarchical rank (red) .
But what does this have to do with power? Consider the following Weberian
definitions of power:
1. “the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons”
(Bendix 1998; cited in Wallimann et al. 1977)
2. “the chance of obtaining the obedience of others to a particular command”
(Aron 1964; cited in Wallimann et al. 1977)
These definitions suggests that power within a hierarchy should be proportional
to the number of subordinates under one’s control. I put this into formula form
as:
hierarchical power= 1+ number of subordinates (5)
Everyone starts with a power of 1, meaning they have control over themselves.
Hierarchical power then increases linearly with the number of subordinates.
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Figure 6: Average Income vs. Hierarchical Power Within Case-Study Firms
This figure shows data from six firm case studies (Audas et al., 2004; Baker et al., 1993;
Dohmen et al., 2004; Lima, 2000; Morais and Kakabadse, 2014; Treble et al., 2001). The
vertical axis shows average income within each hierarchical level of the firm (relative to
the base level) , while the horizontal axis shows my metric for average power, which is
equal to one plus the average number of subordinates below a given hierarchical level.
Each point represents a single firm-year observation, and color indicates the particular
case study. Grey regions around the regression indicate the 95% prediction interval.
See Fix (2018c) for a detailed discussion of sources and methods.
The question is, can hierarchical power explain the income returns to hierar-
chical rank? Figure 6 suggests that it can. Here I plot data from six case studies
of firm hierarchy. The vertical axis indicates average income within each hierar-
chical rank (of each firm). The horizontal axis indicates the average hierarchical
power of the rank in question. The result is a tight correlation. This suggests
that income within these firms is mostly a function of social position, rather than
individual traits.
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The results in Figure 5 beg more questions. Why does this correlation exist?
What is the mechanism at work? Is it social norms? Rules of thumb? Ideology?
Is the correlation unique to these firms? Or universal across all firms? Does it
change with time? These are all open questions. The important point is that
these questions will not be posed if we remain fixated on human capital theory.
6 Conclusions
Science is reductionism. However, income distribution theory has tended to-
wards greedy reductionism — a term coined by Daniel Dennet. He writes: “in
their eagerness for a bargain, in their zeal to explain too much too fast, [greedy
reductionists] ... underestimate the complexities, trying to skip whole layers
or levels of theory in their rush to fasten everything securely and neatly to the
foundation” (Dennett, 1995).
Human capital theory is greedy reductionist. It offers extremely simple prin-
ciples that purport to explain everyone’s wages, all the time. It posits a universal
connection between human capital, productivity, and income. But when we look
closely at this causal chain, it breaks down entirely. For the most part, produc-
tivity differences between individuals cannot be measured objectively. Studies
that claim to find a link between income and productivity do so by using cir-
cular logic. And when we restrict ourselves to the objective measurement of
productivity, we find that individual productivity differences are systematically
too small to account for levels of income inequality.
Furthermore, there is no agreed upon definition of human capital. Most
definitions are so vague that they are unmeasurable. Andwhenwe define human
capital restrictively, it can account for only a small portion of income variation.
The primary empirical justification for human capital theory has always been the
income returns to education. Yet the available evidence suggests that education
returns are dwarfed by returns to hierarchical rank. And returns to hierarchical
rank are so large that they cannot plausibly be explained in terms of productivity.
To summarize, the evidence against human capital theory seems damning.
And yet human capital theory continues to be the dominant theory of personal
income distribution. Why? The problem is that economists treat human capi-
tal theory as though it were true by default. Neoclassical economists’ unspoken
article of faith is that wages stem from individual traits. All evidence is then in-
terpreted as though this were true. If education and on-the-job training poorly
explain income, this is not a problem. There must be some other skill that we
are not measuring. Or what if hierarchical rank explains income better than ed-
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ucation? Not a problem. Hierarchical rank must measure some form of human
capital. When we think this way, the truth of human capital theory becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
We should not mince words. Human capital theory is a thought virus that is
blocking the scientific study of income distribution. Alternative hypotheses are
needed badly. I believe the most promising way forward is to focus on social
hierarchy. When we do so, we acknowledge that individual income can have a
social cause. The beauty of hierarchy is that it is both ubiquitous and it is simple
enough that we can easily model it. The first step is to study how hierarchical
rank affects income. This is difficult because the available data is sparse. But
by using models, we can make estimates. For instance, using an empirically
informed model, I have found that hierarchal rank affects US income more than
any other factor for which data is available (Fix, 2018c). I have also found
that firm hierarchy may be responsible for generating the power-law tail of US
income distribution (Fix, 2018b). Hierarchy may even play a role in functional
income distribution (Fix, 2018a).
These results are promising, but we should admit our state of ignorance. At
present, we know very little about the role that hierarchy plays in determining
income. And we will continue to know very little as long as human capital theory
dominates the study of income distribution.
Notes
Data and analysis for this paper are available at the Open Science Framework:
https://osf.io/m9gpc/
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